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COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
ANNUAL MEETING
The program of the 40th Annual Meeting of The Colorado Bar
Association at the Antlers Hotel in Colorado Springs on Friday and
Saturday, September 10 and 11, 1937, opens with a luncheon on
Friday given by Wilbur F. Denious, of Denver, in honor of former
Governor Landon of Kansas, after which the Association convenes in
business session, whereat President Leigh K. Lydecker, of New York
City, will extend greetings from the annual convention of Phi Delta
Phi, which will just have concluded its sessions at the Antlers. The
main address of the afternoon will be delivered by Clifford H. Stone,
of Gunnison, on Colorado's Water Conservation Board. It is hoped
that Gov. Landon likewise may be heard from at that session. Com-
mittee reports will be heard, including those on Interstate Water, by
Malcolm Lindsey, chairman, and on Integration of the Bar, by Robert
L. Stearns, chairman.
Friday night will be delivered the annual address before the Asso-
ciation by Hon. Frank J. Arnold, of Lincoln, Neb., on Recent Tax
Reform Measures in Nebraska.
Saturday morning comes the President's address, A Lawyer's Place
in a Constitutional Democracy, by Robert L. Stearns, of Boulder; which
will be followed by an address on Recent Legislation from Robert D.
Charlton, of Denver. Saturday afternoon Lee Taylor Casey, of Denver,
will deliver Some Observations on the Treatment of Criminals; after
which Henry P. Weihofen, of Boulder, will present The Parole System
Under Fire.
Saturday evening at 7:45 -o'clock the associates and their ladies
will be seated at the annual dinner, where responses to toasts will be
heard from an unusual list-of speakers.
On the social side, on Friday evening Miss Mary F. Lathrop, of
Denver, gives her dinner to the ladies, and Donald C. McCreery, of
Denver, will be host at the past presidents' dinner.
The officers of the Association for the current year are:
President, ROBERT L. STEARNS, Dean of the Law School of the
University of Colorado, Boulder;
First Vice-President, W. W. PLATT, Alamosa;
Second Vice-President, HORACE N. HAWKINS, JR., Denver;
Secretary and Treasurer, H. M. HUMPHREYS, Denver.
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ACCOUNTING PROBLEMS OF AN EXECUTOR UNDER
A WILL WHICH ESTABLISHES A RESIDUARY TRUST
Determining the Share of the Income Distributable to the Life
Tenant During the Executorship-What Constitutes
True Income-Finding the "Clear" Residue.
By LEROY MCWHINNEY, of the Denver Bar; Vice-President,
The International Trust Company.
In order to present in concrete form the problem stated
in the caption of this paper, let us assume the commonplace
situation of an estate in which the will disposes of the dece-
dent's personal effects, provides for one or more cash legacies,
and gives the residue to a trustee to pay the income therefrom
to A (let us say the widow) for life, with remainder over to B
(let us say the son), with no definition of income and no direc-
tion as to the date from which the life tenant shall receive the
income. It is immaterial to our illustration whether the exec-
utor and trustee are one and the same person or institution or
are different persons or institutions.
The situation thus stated is the typical groundwork for
a residuary testamentary trust. After delivering the personal
effects to the legatees entitled thereto, the executor will proceed
to distribute the balance of such an estate about as follows:
To the expenses of the last illness and funeral, which he will pay
almost immediately; to the expenses of administration, little of which
will be paid until he is ready to close his final accounts; to debts, which
he will discharge from time to time as allowed and funds therefor become
available; to inheritance, estate and other taxes which he will pay at
various dates; then to the legacies; and finally will turn over what he
has left to the trustee--ordinarily about fifteen to eighteen months after
the death of the testator. Duri.g the course of his executorship he may
also, doubtless should, make some distributions of income to the life
tenant.
As to scarcely a single one of these disbursements can the
executor know in advance the amount thereof or the date when
it will be made. Obviously, however, the executor may not
thus complete his administration without determining what
among his various receipts is true income, what, of that which
is true income, is distributable to the life tenant, and what
constitutes the principal or capital fund of the residue to be
turned over to the trustee. It follows that these three deter-
minations are actually involved in every case of a residuary
testamentary trust and that few problems of mixed probate
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law and accounting are of greater practical importance to both
executors and their counsel.
At first approach the answer to these questions may ap-
pear simple. We are naturally impelled to say that the income
in the hands of the executor is the aggregate of the dividends,
interest, rents, royalties, and the like, which he receives; that
the income distributable to the life tenant is all of the income
received by the executor; that the residue is just what it ap-
pears to be: namely, the mass left in the executor's hands when
he comes into court to settle his final accounts. Not so. Prob-
ably no. one of these first blush impressions will square with
the weight of authority.
In practice there is a tendency to ignore such questions,
partly because they present considerable difficulty and partly
because we sometimes assume that the executor's discharge will
forever bury his faults, with no real damage to the life bene-
ficiary. This latter assumption is too dangerous for comfort.
It has at least once been squarely held that even though the
executor has grossly under-distributed to the life tenant, the
error cannot be corrected after the executor has settled his
accounts, that the trustee may not make the adjustment, and
that the loss to the life tenant is permanent.* It is, therefore,
plainly the executor's duty to make an honest effort at correct
accounting.
In the discussion which follows it will be necessary for
us to make frequent reference to five factors in our problem.
For the sake of brevity it seems best at the outset to christen
these factors and to agree upon a definition for each, which we
may do as follows:
1. Actual Income embraces all receipts in the nature of income or
which are commonly called income.
2. True Income is that which the law considers to be income
for a particular purpose in hand-here, as between life tenant and
remainderman.
3. Equitable Income is that income arrived at by applying a rate
of interest deemed by equity to represent a fair average return on a
given class of securities during a given period.
4. Clear Residue is that property which does (or will) constitute
the principal of the residuary trust in the hands of the trustees.
5. Eligible Assets or Securities are those of a character which the
executor and trustee are authorized to permanently retain or to purchase.
Broadly stated, the commonly accepted doctrines with
*Selleck v. Hawley (Mo. 1932). 56 S. W. 387, 395.
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reference to the three phases of the executor's accounting here
under consideration may be thus summarized:
First: THE RULE FOR DETERMINING TRUE INCOME
To arrive at his true income the executor should exclude from his
actual receipts in the general nature of income the following:
(a) Apportionable income (such as interest and rents) accrued
at the date of death,
(b) All income from wasting assets,
(c) All income from ineligible investments,
(d) Requisite sums to amortize premiums on bonds purchased by
the executor;
and contra should include:
Equitable income on account of wasting or ineligible assets.
Second: THE RULE FOR DETERMINING THE LIFE
TENANT'S INCOME
The income available for distribution by the executor to the life
tenant during the period of the executorship is that part of the true
income which arises, or is deemed by equity to arise, from the clear
residue-as distinguished from income arising from assets which never
become a part of the clear residue. This latter class of income does not
go to the life tenant, but does go to the principal of the residue.
Third: THE RULE FOR DETERMINING RESIDUAL
PRINCIPAL
The residual principal is determined by deducting the amount of
the life tenant's income (for the period of the executorship) from the
residual mass remaining in the hands of the executor after all other
distributions and disbursements have been completed. This operation
should be performed by the executor. Subsequent determination by the
trustee may be permissible, but in view of the holding of the Missouri
court above mentioned denying such right to the trustee, it is safer to
have this duty fully discharged by the executor.
Let us next consider briefly the theory of the law which
underlies the rules we have just stated. There is in the some-
what confused body of decisions and text writers' statements
a fairly solid core of opinion representing the weight of au-
thority and substantially consistent with the principles
adopted and announced in the Restatement of the Law of
Trusts. Underlying the whole subject is the premise, thor-
oughly established by the best authority, that, in such a case
as ours, the gift made by the testator in providing for the resid-
uary trust is of a residue to be ascertained in accordance with
the rules of equity and which the courts commonly call the
"clear" residue; and a gift of the income arising from that
"clear" residue. And it is likewise true that in our jurisdic-
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tion, and most other jurisdictions, the right to receive this
income dates from the death of the testator. It seems to me
that this conception may be likened to a gift of the kernel of a
nut, which gift does not include the hull or the shell. The
kernel is the clear residue and the shell is that part of the gross
estate which goes to pay debts, expenses, legacies, etc. By this
same doctrine the kernel which is thus bequeathed to the trus-
tee is deemed in equity to exist within the shell from the begin-
ning: i. e., from the date of the testator's death. And further-
more, it is deemed to consist of that type of asset of which it
ultimately must be made to consist: namely, of eligible assets
and nothing else. Obviously, eligible assets may be of either
or both of two classes which are not necessarily alike:
First--Securities owned by the testator, the permanent retention of
which he has actually authorized in his will; and
Second-The type of securities which he has authorized the trustee
or executor to purchase for reinvestment (in the absence of expressed
authority, then securities authorized by statute).
We recognize, however, that the clear residue may in fact
temporarily include non-eligible assets. In such case, equity
will consider that these non-eligible assets have actually been
converted to eligible investments as of the date of the death of
the testator and that the income derived therefrom, for the
purposes of accounting between life tenant and remainderman,
is that income which would have been produced thereby had
such non-eligible assets been so converted. The income thus
arbitrarily raised by equity is equitable income, as we have
already defined that phrase.
Now, if we grant the premises just stated, and such is the
weight of authority, we may easily proceed to adopt the fol-
lowing corollaries:
1. That the income available for the life tenant is only that
income arising from the clear residue or kernel (because the bequest of
income is, by its very terms, of the income on the clear residue, and on
that only).
2. That such income is the actual income produced by eligible
assets (less required premium amortization), plus equitable income on
non-eligible or wasting assets temporarily held in the clear residue.
3. That the balance of the actual income received by the executor
from all sources is added to principal-is, therefore, applicable to the




The courts and text writers accepting these principles
differ somewhat in their detailed application. For example,
there are two well recognized methods of determining the
amount of income available for the life tenant, or, conversely,
the amount of income which is to be transferred to principal.
First Method: One group, including the authors of the
Restatement of the Law of Trusts, get at it by first computing
the amount of income applicable to the payment of debts, leg-
acies, expenses, etc., which sum, once determined, they then
subtract from the aggregate true income and credit the balance
of the true income to the life tenant. To illustrate: Assume,
for the sake of simplicity, that the various sums paid out by
the executor on various dates for debts, taxes, legacies, or ex-
penses, and the like, aggregate $20,000 and were all paid out
on the same day, exactly twelve months after the testator's
death. The sponsors of the first method would determine the
sum which, at death, plus interest at an equitable rate for
twelve months, would equal $20,000. Let us say, $19,400.
They would apply $600 of the true income, plus $19,400 of
principal to pay debts, expenses, etc., thereby diminishing by
such $600 the income otherwise available for the life tenant,
and, in effect, thereby augmenting the clear residue by the
same $600. In a fairly substantial estate, with the payment
of legacies and Federal estate taxes delayed for twelve months
or more, this sum is substantial and important. In practice,
the first (or Restatement) method, which we have just illus-
trated, is complicated by the variety of the sums to be paid,
and of the dates upon which payment is made, and is further
complicated by the fact that its application requires that the
apparent or actual income in the hands of the executor be first
reduced to true income in accordance with the principles above
outlined.
Second Method: The other, or second method, which we
may call the equitable rule, is more simple, produces about the
same mathematical result and seems to have no important dis-
advantages. Its disciples wait until the executor is ready to
file his final account, at which period the residual mass is auto-
matically determined. They then appraise the actual residual
assets and determine their present worth as of the date of the
testator's death, at equitable interest. To illustrate: Assume
the residual assets to be worth $103,000; the elapsed time to
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be an even year; the equitable rate of interest to be 3 %; divide
the $103,000 by 1.03; the resulting $100,000 is the principal
forming the clear residue; the $3,000 is the income distribu-
table to the life tenant. True, the executor may have already
distributed some income to the life tenant based upon his mini-
mum estimate of the net result. If so, the amount so distrib-
uted is added to the value of the residual assets before effecting
the division.*
While the limits of this article do not permit of a com-
prehensive review of the authorities, we may examine a few.
At the outset we may note that the fundamental principle of
our rule of procedure in such cases is of English origin and that
the leading case is Allhusen v. Whittell, L. R. 4 Eq. 295
(1867).f
*The equitable rule, illustrated in the body of the article, contemplates a valuation
of the residual.assets at the time when they are ready to be turned over by the executor
to the trustee. Obviously, this value may differ materially from the value (actual or the-
oretical) as of the date of the testator's death, and this situation seems fairly recognized by
the courts, particularly in Edwards v. Edwards, 183 Mass. 581. In the Edwards case the
non-eligible asset was unimproved real estate inventoried by the executor at $150,000.
appraised when turned over to the trustee at $155,000, and later sold by the trustee
for about $196,000. This was, therefore, a case in which the conversion of the non-
eligible asset was postponed beyond the date of the transfer of the trust fund by the
executor to the trustee. The court took the ultimately realized value (approximately
$196,000) as the basis for determining the income of the life tenant from the date of
the testator's death to the date of conversion. This seems to recognize a practice of
postponing the determination of the life tenant's income on non-eligible assets until
after the executor has closed his accounts. The power of the court to go back of the
final settlement of the executor's accounts was apparently not challenged in this case.
In the case of Mulcahy v. Johnson, 80 Colo. 499, being an equitable action against the
trustees after the executor had been discharged, the court approved and directed distribu-
tion by the trustees to the life tenant of funds in the hands of the trustees which arose
from income received by the executor. Apparently the right to raise such question
after the closing of the executor's accounts was not presented in the case. However, in
view of the doctrine announced in the case of Selleck v. Hawley (supra), the practice
of postponing the determination of the life tenant's income for the period of the execu-
torship until after the executor's accounts have been closed is not to be commended.
Consequently, it is doubtless wiser, in a case where the actual liquidation or conversion
of the ineligible assets does not take place during the executorship, to nevertheless settle
the question of the life tenant's income for the period of the executorship at the time
when the executor closes his accounts and turns over the assets to the trustee. This
could have been done in the Edwards case without violence to the principle involved, if
the life tenant's income attributable to the real estate during the executorship had been
settled at the close of the executorship on the basis of a valuation of $155,000 and her
income attributable to that source for the subsequent period intervening before the actual
conversion had been settled on the basis of a valuation of $196,000.
tThe syllabus in Allhusen v. Whittell reads as follows: "Where a testator has
bequeathed legacies, and given his residue to a tenant for life, with remainder over,
executors, though, as between themselves and the persons interested in the residue, they
are at liberty to have recourse to any funds they please in order to pay debts and legacies,
yet will be treated by the court, in adjusting the accounts between tenant for life and
remainderman, as having paid the debts and legacies not out of capital only, nor out of
income only, but with such portion of the capital as, together with the income of that
portion for one year, was sufficient for the purpose."
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The English doctrine is likewise stated with apparent
approval in Perry on Trusts, 7th Edition, paragraph 551,
page 940. t
Perhaps the best textbook statement of the rule as now
embodied in the American procedure is that by Loring in his
Trustee's Handbook, 4th Edition (1928), page 154, which
reads as follows:
"In general, at the time the estate comes into the trustee's hands
it is all principal in whatever condition it may happen to be, and all
yearly increase thereafter is income. This would always be the case if
the property came to him without delay and in the form of proper trust
investments. Unless the settlor provides otherwise, the life tenant is
entitled to income from the time of the testator's death; therefore, when
for any reason property does not come into the hands of the trustee for
some time after the beginning of the trust, the fund when received will
be so apportioned that the life tenant will get the proper rate of interest
from the beginning of the trust, and the remainder will be the principal.
"Where the trust fund is established by a legacy, ordinarily it will
not be paid over by the executors until they wind up the estate and settle
their accountn. This will necessarily be so if the trust fund is the residue
of the estate. The general rule as applied in such cases is to find that sum
which, with interest from the date of the testator's death at the rate
which it would have earned if properly invested, will with the interest
added equal the sum received from the executors."
Similar statements of the rule in Cyc. and R. C. L. are
cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. In
re Leitsch's Will, 20.1 N. W. 284 (1924).§
f"When the trust principal is a residue which cannot be exactly ascertained until
after the payment of debts and legacies which do not bear interest during the first year
after the testator's death, it has been held, and seems to be the rule in England, that the
life tenant should be given, not the income of the whole estate, but the income only
of so much of the estate as is ultimately to constitute the trust fund. This principal of
the residuary estate is to be determined by deducting from the entire fund out of which
debts and legacies are to be paid, the sum which, 'together with the income of such part
for the year, will be wanted for the payment of debts, legacies, and other charges, during
the year; and the proper and necessary fund must be ascertained by including the income
for one year which may arise upon the fund which may be so wanted.' "
§40 Cyc. page 1882. "It is settled by the great weight of authority that in the
case of a bequest of a life estate in a residuary fund, or of some aliquot part thereof, if
no time is prescribed in the will for the commencement of the interest or the enjoyment
of the use or income of such residue, the legatee for life is 'entitled to the interest or
income of the clear residue, as afterward ascertained to be computed from the time of
the death of the testator."
28 R. C. L. page 355. "So where there is the bequest. of the whole or of an
aliquot part of the residue of an estate to a legatee for life, remainder over, and no time
is fixed by the will for the commencementof such life use, the legatee is entitled to the
use or income of the clear residue so bequeathed, as the same may be at last ascertained
to be computed from the death of the testator."
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In Stanley v. Stanley, 142 At. 851, 855-856 (Conn.
1928), the residue was given one-half outright to Stanley and
one-half to trustees to pay the income for life to A with re-
mainder to B. The point for discussion was the'disposition of
the income earned on Stanley's half of the residue during the
executorship, which income the court allocated to the residue;
i. e., one-half to Stanley and the other one-half to the principal
of the trust fund. The court said in part:
"The other one-half of the income earned (i. e., the part earned
on * * * Stanley's legacy) did not belong to * * * Stanley
(as income) for he was a general legatee, nor to the trustee (as income)
* * * since they had received all of the income which their one-half
had earned. The will does not dispose of it otherwise than by the
residuary clause. Necessarily it became a part of the residue and subject
to the disposition made of all the residue, one-half to * * * Stanley
and one-half to the trustees * * * * * * We are asked, in view
of the conclusions reached, as to the disposition of the undisposed of
income, whether it became principal or income * * *. It became
part of the residue and hence principal." (Words within parentheses
are explanatory and were not used by the court.)
To the same effect is the language of the Restatement of
the Law of Trusts, at Section 234, paragraph g, which reads
as follows:
"To the extent to which the income received by the executor during
the period of administration is derived from property which is subse-
quently used in paying legacies and discharging debts and expenses of
administration, and has not been applied to the payment of interest on
such legacies, debts and expenses, the trustee is entitled to receive the
same, but it should be added to principal and not paid to the beneficiary
entitled to income."
Upon the method of computing the "clear" residue and
the life tenant's share of the income, the authority for the first
method mentioned above is also the Restatement at Section
234 in a later portion of paragraph g.£ The second method,
or so-called "equitable" rule, is very clearly presented in the
case of Equitable Trust Company v. Kent, 101 Ati. 875, 877-
878 (Del. Chancery 1917), where the court reviews the whole
problem, notes the desirability of simplification, adds a fine
statement from Hill on Trustees, and approves Mr. Loring's
£See also Accounting Principles and Procedure, Lecture 45, by Charles H. Linger.




rule above quoted. The concluding portion of this part of the
opinion reads as follows:
. "The simplest, most practicable and equitable rule is that which
Hill on Trustees says has the weightiest authority, and which is adopted
in Loring's Trustees' Handbook at page 122 (3d ed.), viz., equitable
instead of actual income-that is to say, the sum which the life bene-
ficiary would have received at the end of a year after the death of the
testator if the trust fund had been invested at a certain selected rate of
interest from the death of the testator. To illustrate, if the fund was
$10,000 and the interest rate be fixed at five per cent, then if that sum
be divided by 105 the result, $9,523.80, will represent principal and the
balance, $476.20, will represent income for one year. This latter sum
being five per cent of the former. This method is the simplest because
it is based on simple terms in the calculation thereof; is not dependent
on the classifications of the estate by the executor; and disregards the
sources from which the fund is produced. It is equitable because it is
applicable to productive and unproductive assets; includes proceeds of
real estate as well as personalty; disregards proportions of productivity
of income; includes all kinds of income such as rents, interest, dividends
and accretions; and, which is highly important, gives to the life benefi-
ciary income for the first year unaffected by the delays of executors in
administering the estate of the decedent, or in paying over and delivering
the trust fund.
"It would be applicable whether there was, or was not, an equi-
table conversion of realty into personalty. It should also be applied in
cases where the trustee by authority of the Court of Chancery takes in
specie in payment of a legacy property of the decedent, * * *
"The rate of interest should be such as a trustee by careful, con-
servative investment in suitable trust investments could reasonably realize
as interest or income, and should not be the legal rate of interest fixed
by law as between debtor and creditor. Edwards v. Edwards, 183
Mass. 581, 67 N. E. 658."
Further statements and numerous citations, both pro and
con, will be found in Restatement of Trusts, Tentative Draft
No. 4 (American Law Institute), pages 195-197.J
Now it will be noted that, if the last mentioned, or second
JAmong the relatively recent decisions are two which hold that the life tenant of
a residuary trust is entitled to the interest arising on sums, which sums were later applied
to the payment of debts, legacies, etc., and are, therefore, in direct conflict with the rules
cited in the body of the article. The first of these cases is Old Colony Trust Company
v. Smith, 165 N. E. 657 (Mass. 1929), and the second is City Bank Farmers Trust
Company v. Taylor, 163 Atl. 734 (Rd. Is. 1933). The second case relies chiefly on
the first case for its authority and the applicability of all the other authorities cited by
both cases is fairly subject to question. It must probably be assumed that the decision
in these cases was a deliberate attempt to change the rule to effect what these courts
thought to be simplicity and the increased advantage of the life tenant. In neither of
these cases was there involved any question of the income from non-productive, wasting,
or ineligible assets.
method is applied, it will not be necessary, in determining
either the life tenant's income or the "clear" residue, to go into
a determination of what part of the actual income was true
income because the so-called equitable rule automatically con-
fines the life tenant to equitable income (which will approxi-
mate the true income on the clear residue). Nevertheless, we
may note in closing certain landmark authorities on the man-
ner of determining true income, as distinguished from what is
sometimes called the actual income. As a premise we may
review at the outset the axiom that the trustee is under a duty
to dispose of property included in the trust at the time of its
creation which would not be a proper investment for the trus-
tee to make, unless specially authorized to permanently retain
such property. (Restatement of Law of Trusts, Sec. 230.)
From this premise we naturally proceed to the question of the
disposition to be made of the actual income received from the
assets which the trustee was under a duty to sell. As above
indicated, the answer is that the life tenant is entitled to equi-
table income on the actual or theoretical proceeds of such
assets as if converted to eligibles on the day of the testator's
death; that, if the actual exceeds the equitable income, the
excess goes to principal; while, if the actual is less than the
equitable income, the deficiency will be raised from principal.
Sec. 241 of the Restatement deals with the subject as follows:
"* * * if property held in trust * * * is property which
the trustee is under a duty to sell, and which produces no income or an
income substantially less than the current rate of return on trust invest-
ments, or which is wasting property or produces an income substantially
more than the current rate of return on trust investments, and the trustee
does not immediately sell the property, the trustee should make an ap-
portionment of the proceeds of the sale when made.
"The net proceeds received from the sale of the property are appor-
tioned by ascertaining the sum which with interest thereon at the current
rate of return on trust investments from the day when the duty to sell
arose to the day of the sale would equal the net proceeds; and the sum
so ascertained is to be treated as principal, and the residue of the net pro-
ceeds as income. * * * In this case the beneficiary is entitled to
income calculated from the day of the creation of the trust, since the
duty to sell arises at that time, although by the terms of the trust the
trustee is authorized to postpone the sale or although he properly post-
pones the sale because the sale could not be effected immediately without
undue loss to the trust."
The leading case is Hemenway v. Hemenway, 134 Mass.
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446, 450-452, where the rule regarding income from non-
eligible assets temporarily retained is thus stated:
"It often happens, of course, that testators leave property of a
kind which executors would not be authorized to invest in * * *
In such cases, the law allows the executor a proper time for the purpose
of disposing of such property. But the fact that time is allowed in
order to prevent a sacrifice does not make the investment an authorized
one ad interim in such sense as to entitle the tenant for life to the actual
dividends. The conversion would be made at once, if it were practicable,
and the rights of the parties are not affected by the delays. The fund is
treated as if converted and the tenant for life is allowed a fixed percentage
on the amount. * * * The same thing is true where a testator
allows time for the same purpose."
While the rules thus stated are the more logical, are sus-
tained by the best reasoned cases and text book authorities, and
apparently constitute the only accounting system which can
be squared with the conclusions so painstakingly arrived at by
the authors of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts, there is
much conflict in the authorities. Moreover, these rules are
general principles, subject, at best, to some exceptions and
some special applications, for the development of which there
is no place in this outline. For example: the subject of allo-
cation between principal and income in the case of defaulted
and foreclosed mortgages, upon which there is much recent
authority, some of which is highly confusing, but which may,
in the main, be reconciled with the general rules of apportion-
ment on the basis of equitable income from the date of default.
See Columbia Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 1, page 61.
The modern Massachusetts rule, as established in the Old
Colony Trust Company case (supra), or the similar rule re-
cently established by statute in New York, or any one or more
of numerous special rules or variations suggested by other
courts, may appear to one or another of us more satisfactory
than the majority rules above reviewed. In this paper, how-
ever, our object is not to devise or adopt an ideal, but to state
the law as we find it. We are substantially without judicial
precedent in Colorado and cannot forecast the action of our
Supreme Court on these questions. The Commissioners on
Uniform Laws have prepared an accounting code endeavoring
to arbitrarily settle a large number of such points, but that
code is undergoing considerable dispute and has been adopted
by but two states. Probably we will long be without either
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judicial or legislative guides in this state. In the meantime, it
would seem wisest to follow the majority rules as far as prac-
ticable, yet simplifying our work whenever possible by the
exercise of some foresight. Specifically, it is most respectfully
suggested to the members of the bar that as they write the wills
of the future they either embody an accounting code of their
own or expressly give to the executor and trustee adequate
powers to conduct his accounting according to his own best
judgment, or according to the opinion of his counsel, making
such decisions conclusive on the parties in interest.
July 25, 1937.
DEAR DICTA:
In the interest of learning rather than of the law, atten-
tion is directed to our state Supreme Court's opinion in Assur-
ance Society vs. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, where at page 235
of the opinion the court quotes Mr. Justice Cordozo as having
said: "The attempted distinction between accidental results
and accidental means will plunge this branch of the law into
a Serbonian bog," following which our court with delightful
humor says: "Whatever kind of bog that is we concur." To
which may we add the words of Webster's Unabridged:
"Serbonian bog: A large bog or lake in Egypt sur-
rounded by hills of loose sand, which, being blown into it,
afforded a treacherous footing; figuratively, a difficult or com-
plicated situation; a mess; a predicament."
This is not intended in any wise as a reflection upon the
undoubted learning of the Chief Justice who wrote this opin-
ion, and who gave this graceful gesture of modesty and good
humor. His opinions are too frequently adorned with refer-
ences to sources of learning too deep and far removed from the
browsings of the average mind to admit of such implication.
As instance, in Baker vs. Couch, 74 Colo. 380, at page 382,
these words of his:
"Said contract, upon which one of the defenses is based,
recited that its consideration was love and affection, but if any
deity presided over this affair it is evident that it was not




GENERAL DEMURRER-ULTIMATE FACT-CONCLUSIONS OF LAW-
INJUNCTION-Rozman vs. Allen et al.-No. 13819-Decided
May 17, 1937-District Court of Gunnison County-Hon.
George W. Bruce, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Defendants in error were plaintiffs below, and plaintiff in
error was defendant below. The parties herein will be denominated as
they were in the trial court. Action was instituted by the plaintiff to
enjoin the obstruction by fences of a road which crossed the defendant's
stock-raising homestead. A temporary injunction was granted, and,
after answer was filed, a general demurrer was interposed by the plaintiff
which was sustained and the injunction made permanent. Defendant
elected to stand on his answer as amended. In 1930 the defendant filed
upon a tract of land which was traversed by a driveway which the plain-
tiff and others had been using for many years in moving cattle back and
forth to the unappropriated public domain. The Gunnison County
Cattle Growers' Assn. petitioned the Secretary of Interior to establish a
new driveway, which petition was granted. The substance of the liti-
gation was whether the defendant, under the circumstances, was entitled
to fence off the old driveway, thereby compelling the plaintiff and others
to use the new driveway in moving-their cattle.
HELD: 1. Plaintiff's contention that the allegation in the defense
that the second driveway was established in lieu and instead of all previ-
ous routes or trails used prior to its establishment is a conclusion of law
is not correct. Under the facts and circumstances it was an allegation of
ultimate fact which the defendant was entitled to prove.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Young concur.
WILLS-TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY--SIGNATURES-EXPERT WIT-
NESSES-Peterson, Executor of the Estate of Clara B. Stitzer vs.
Frank A. Stitzer-No. 13991-Decided May 17, 1937-District
Court of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: On May 4. 1935, the 65 year old testatrix made her will;
she died the next day. The will was lodged in the County Court for
probate and was contested by her 95 year old husband, Frank A. Stitzer,
who will herein be designated as the contestant, on the grounds of lack
of testamentary capacity and undue influence. A jury found it to be
her last will and testament. On appeal to the District Court a jury
returned a verdict that the will was not her last will and testament.
Robert W. Peterson, the proponent of the will, and Stitzer were named
in the will as executors. Testatrix became ill and went to a sanitarium.
The disease which she had does not affect the mind. The day prior to
her death she told Peterson she wanted to make a will. She dictated
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what she wanted, and when it was completed and read to her, she re-
sponded "yes" to the question if that was what she wanted. This all
took place in the presence of disinterested persons, who state that she was
mentally competent at the time. She attempted to sit up in bd so as to
sign the will which was before her. The result of her attempt was an
illegible scrawl. Contestant, for the purpose of comparison of the signa-
ture of testatrix on the will with her signature made under other condi-
tions, introduced, over the objection of proponent, a check on the Colo-
rado National Bank, signed by her in January, 1935. Proponent assigns
error to the admission of this exhibit, contending that it was equivalent
to telling the jury that testatrix did not sign her will and did not have
mental capacity to make a will.
HELD: I. If the testatrix's mental conception of what she was
doing was clear, and she desired to sign the will, her participation in an
attempt to sign it, however slight, renders the signature sufficient.
2. The opinion of an expert is entitled to but little weight when
opposed to the facts and circumstances appearing at the time, and sur-
rounding the making and execution of a will.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
QUIET TITLE-NOTICE-KNOWN ADDRESS, WHAT CONSTITUTES-
TAX DEED-MININCG---TAX SALES-Walter vs. Harrison-No.
13885-Decided May 24, 1937-District Court of Boulder
Count y-Hon. Claude C. Coffin, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action was brought by defendant in error as plaintiff
below to quiet title to certain lode mining claims. Judgment was ren-
dered in favor of the plaintiff, quieting title to him in the premises in
dispute. Plaintiff's title is grounded upon a treasurer's deed based on a
tax sale certificate for 1928 taxes. Application was made and the tax
deed, which is conceded to be valid on its face, was issued in 1933. The
principal attack on the validity of the deed is based upon the alleged
failure of the County Treasurer to comply with the statutory require-
ments in not making diligent inquiry to ascertain the address of one
Hallet, a prominent person in the county and state, in order that copy
of the published notice of the application could be sent him by mail.
HELD: 1. A tax deed which is valid on its face is prima facie
evidence of the regularity of all of the prerequisites necessary to its
execution and delivery.
2. It is the duty of the County Assessor to prepare the tax rolls
and give the names and addresses of the owners thereon, and such address
is a known address within the meaning of the statute, and the Treasurer
is entitled to rely on their being accurate.
3. Extrinsic evidence is admissable to augment the tax deed in
ascertaining whether or not the Treasurer had complied with the statute.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Bakke concur.
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS- DISCLOSURE - FRAUD--EQUITY-LAW
-Miller vs. Goff-No. 13997-Decided May 24, 1937-District
Court of Denver-Hon. James C. Starkweather, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The parties will be mentioned as plaintiff and defendant,
as they appeared in the trial court. Plaintiff and others were attempting
to acquire the rights to prior locators on claims in oil fields in Wyoming.
The Midwest Oil Company obtained a lease from the Federal Govern-
ment including the above claims and was desirous of acquiring the rights
existing by virtue of prior claims, its lease being subject to these rights
under the provisions of the Federal "Leasing Act." Plaintiff and his
then associates enlisted the aid of defendant in acquiring the claims and
disposing of them to the Midwest Oil Company. Defendant was confi-
dent that he could accomplish the sale through F. G. Bpnfils of Denver.
To establish their interests the parties, including defendant, entered into
an agreement whereby each was to share and share alike. A sale was
made to the oil company through Bonfils, who, it is alleged by plaintiff,
was paid $148,500, and who, with his attorney and the defendant,
distributed the money on the basis of $125,000. Distribution was made
June 1, 1924, and the entire matter so remained until August of 1931,
when a widow of one of the parties learned that $148,500 had been paid
in the settlement instead of $125,000. Plaintiff brought suit, joining
with him the widow's interest, against Bonfils in equity for an account-
ing. Bonfils died and his executors paid plaintiff $7,500 in settlement.
Plaintiff then sued defendant, who had received in excess of what he
should have received, for a money judgment.
HELD: 1. The suit against Bonfils was in equity, and the action
against Miller was one at law. The remedies plaintiff sought in the
two actions were consistent and independent and the compromise in the
Bonfils suit in no way prejudiced the defendant, Miller.
2. The three-year statute of. limitations is not a bar to an action
if the defendant is charged with the duty of a full and complete disclosure
to plaintiff of all the details of the transaction. Failing therein, he will
not be permitted to assert lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
WATER RIGHTS-RES JUDICATA-DEPARTURE--STATUTES---STAT-
UTE OF LIMITATIONS-ESTOPPEL -ADVERSE USE-OWNER-
SHIP-Luxen vs. The Town of Rifle et al.-No. 13961 -Decided
May 24, 1937-District Court of Garfield County-Hon. John
T. Shumate, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Plaintiff brought suit in the trial court to enjoin the town
of Rifle from using more than its alleged allotment of water from Beaver
Creek in said county. Demurrers were filed by defendants, which were
overruled and a temporary restraining order was entered, after which the
defendants answeed, setting up thg defenses of statutes of limitations,
estoppel, and res judicata. The replication sought to void these de-
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fenses by setting up the plea of acquisition by adverse use. The defend-
ants then demurred to the replication on the grounds of departure, which
was sustained. Under a decree of 1888, plaintiff was given 65 cubic
feet of water per minute of time for irrigation from the Clausen Ditch
No. 8; and Starke and the town, claiming under the Starke Ditch No.
15, were given 55 cubic feet. The decree further provided that in case
of shortage the two ditches were to have all the water, share and share
alike. In 1890 the decree was changed, giving each 60 feet. In 1906
the town, having acquired the Starke priority, filed a petition with court
to change the point of diversion so the water could be used for town pur-
poses. A decree was entered allowing the diversion, and a stipulation
was entered into to the effect that no one's rights would be considered
interfered with excepting that they shall all be subject to and subsequent
in point of time and right to town's priority as changed by the proceed-
ing. From 1906 to 1932 no one had any occasion to question the pro-
visions of the 1906 decree because there wasn't any shortage of water,
until in 1932 it became necessary for the town to use all of the water.
HELD: 1. A judgment on matters not litigated cannot be res
judicata as to them. The plaintiff's alleged damages never having been
litigated, he has a right to have them determined.
2. Sections 1784, 1785, 1789, C. L. 1921, urged by the town
as the statute of limitations are not applicable, because these sections
limit the power to question the decree only to the right and measure of
diversion.
3. Estoppel is available only against one who consciously acqui-
esces in something being done to his detriment, the other elements of
estoppel being present.
4. Acquisition of title by adverse user set out in the replication
is not a departure from the plea of general ownership in the complaint,
because evidence to prove adverse user would be receivable in proving
general ownership.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Young concur.
ABSTRACT OF RECORD,--WHAT IT MUST CONTAIN-APPEAL AND
ERROR-Reuss vs. Raleigh Company, Inc.-No. 14068-Decided
May 24, 1937-District Court of Denver-Hon. James C. Stark-
weather, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action ivas on an open account, for goods and merchan-
dise. Default judgment was entered May 2, 1933. More than three
years later plaintiffs in error moved to vacate for want of jurisdiction
because no summons was served. Their motion was denied and they
brought error.
HELD: 1. The abstract of record must comply with Rule 36 to
be a basis for a consideration of the assignments of error.
2. If the abstract does not set forth the substance of the summons
in question, it is for all practical purposes no abstract.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Knous and Mr.
Justice Holland concur.
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DISBARMENT-PLEA OF NOLO CONTENDERE-PERJURY-DETER-
MINING CORRECTNESS OF CHARGES-State of Colorado vs. Edi-
son-No. 1411 O-Decided June 1, 193 7--Original Proceeding in
Disbarment-Dismissed.
FACTS: It was charged in the petition that in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, respondent, an
attorney of the Colorado bar, was indicted for the crime of perjury; that
to the charge she entered a plea of nolo contendere, upon which she was
ordered committed to a federal institution for women for one year and
a day, but the order was suspended during respondent's good behavior
for one year. Answering, respondent admitted the return of the indict-
ment, her plea of nolo contendere, the sentence imposed and suspension
thereof, all as charged; but she denied her guilt of the crime of perjury
in the matter of the indictment and said that she entered the plea of nolo
contendere on the advice of counsel, themselves believing her to be inno-
cent, but sensing what they conceived to be a menacing prejudice in the
forum of her trial, and convinced there was grave danger she would fare
illy at the hands of a jury, advised her to enter the plea. The Supreme
Court being of the opinion that the law did not preclude, and justice
required, inquiry in due course as to the truth of the charge of perjury
against respondent, referred the matter to the District Court, with in-
structions to take testimony and make findings of fact. That court
found that respondent entered the plea of nolo contendere on the advice
of counsel, which, the circumstances considered, conforming to her an-
swer in that regard, the court said was warranted and that the respond-
ent was not guilty of perjuzy, and that she had not otherwise offended
as a member of the bar.
HELD: I. The plea of nolo contendere, when accepted by the
court, is an implied confession of guilt, and, for the purposes of the case
only, equivalent to a plea of guilty, but has no effect beyond the particu-
lar case.
2. The Supreme Court, in an original proceeding in disbarment,
is not precluded from determining whether or not the charge and convic-
tion of the respondent, in a court of record, was correct.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
FUTURE INTERESTS-TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS-DUTIES OF HOLD-
ER OF LIFE -ESTATE-LIMITATIONS--PLEADING-MOTIONS--
REMEDIES-Dormer vs. Walker et a.-No. 13773-Decided
June 1, 1937-District Court of Jefferson County-Hon. Samuel
W. Johnson, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: The parties appear here in the same position as in the
court below; Dormer shall be referred to as plaintiff or "remainderman,"
and the defendants as such or as "life tenant" and trustee. Davis con-
veyed to the predecessor of the defendant trustee certain real property
for the life of the defendant, Walker, with remainder in fee simple to
the plaintiff and her co-tenant, Newton, who was not a party to the
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proceeding. The life tenant and remainderman are children of the
grantor. The deed gave to the trustee the power to rent or lease the said
real estate and required the payment by him from said rental of "all taxes
and assessments, including water tax, that may be levied or assessed
against said property when the same are due," and further provided that
in case said taxes and assessments "are not paid within six months after
the same are due and payable, then and in that case the trust hereby
created and all the rights and benefits of Newton (now Walker, the de-
fendant) shall cease and terminate, and the title to said real estate shall
vest immediately in fee simple, in the remainderman, * * * and they
shall be entitled to the immediate possession thereof." Neither the
trustee nor the life tenant paid the general taxes and assessments on the
premises for the year 1930, nor the Moffat Tunnel taxes and interest
for the years 1928, 1929, and 1930. After the elapse of more than six
months after the taxes and assessments were due, plaintiff brought suit
in ejectment to secure possession upon the theory that the alleged breach
by the trustee and the life tenant terminated the life estate and entitled
the remainderman to the immediate possession of the property. The
trial court rendered judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants on
their motion. The life tenant contends that the relief to the plaintiff
lies in other legal or equitable proceedings, and does not extend to the
right to terminate the life estate. Also that the provision in the con-
veyance constitutes a condition subsequent in which case the original
conveyor or her heirs, as owners of the reversionary interest as distin-
guished from a remainderman, are the only ones to have the power of
termination upon breach of the condition subsequent.
HELD: 1. As a matter of law, even where the instrument creat-
ing the life estate is silent as to these items, it is the duty of the owner
of a life estate, who is entitled to receive the rents, issues, and profits
therefrom, to keep paid all current taxes and assessments which, if left
unpaid, may result in a lien effective against the interests subsequent to
the estate for life.
2. An estate for life can be created subject to a special limitation,
a condition subsequent, or an executory limitation or a combination of
these restrictions.
3. The provision terminating the life estate, upon default as was
here provided for the payment of taxes and assessments, amounted to an
executory limitation rather than a condition subsequent.
4. An "executory limitation" is defined as denoting that part of
the language of a conveyance, by virtue of which the interest subject
thereto, upon the occurrence of a stated event, is to be diverted, before the
normal expiration thereof, in favor of another interest in a person other
than the conveyor or his successor in interest.
5. The defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings admits
the truth of the allegations of the complaint.
6. If the conveyance is silent as to the duty of the life tenant with
respect to the payment of taxes during the period of the life estate, if it
merely imposes the duty or obligation to pay such taxes, then if the life
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tenant fails to discharge his duty, the owners of the future interest in the
land involved are generally limited, depending upon the circumstances
of the case, to the following remedies:
(a) An action for damages against the life tenant or his personal
representative;
(b) Mandatory injunction requiring the life tenant to perform
his duty;
(c) Appointment of a receiver to manage and operate the land
and perform the duty;
(d) To impress the life estate with a lien in favor of the remain-
derman where he has made payment of the item which it was the duty
of the life tenant to pay, and,
(e) Compel the life tenant or his personal representative to reim-
burse the owner of the future interest for the sums he may expend in the
payment of such taxes or assessments.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Holland concur.
REPLEVIN-STIPULATIONS-INTENT OF THE PARTIES-JURY-FIX-
ING OF AMOUNT OF LIEN-Timpte Brothers vs. Kayser et a.-
No. 14020-Decided June 1, 1937-District Court of Denver-
Hon. James C. Starkweather, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The defendants claimed a mechanic's lien for work done
on the motor truck of the plaintiffs, now defendants in error. The
plaintiff tendered in full settlement the sum of $619.81, which was
refused by the defendants. The plaintiffs thereupon brought action to
replevy the truck. Defendants contend that the trial court disregarded
the true nature of the action and erroneously permitted the jury to
enlarge its proper functions by bringing in a verdict determining the
amount of the lien, instead of determining whether the amount tendered
by the plaintiffs was or was not insufficient to satisfy the lien. The
parties entered into a stipulation whereby the replevin and redelivery
bonds, or undertakings, respectively, given in a sum double the value of
the truck were canceled and there was substituted a money deposit by
the plaintiffs in a sum sufficient to satisfy a judgment for the maximum
claim of the lien claimant together with the probable costs and expenses.
Clear provision was made for applying the deposit to payment of such a
judgment and for the return of any unused balance to the plaintiffs.
The controversy arises because of the position taken by the lien claimant,
namely, that the deposit is not to be used for the purpose of paying out
of it the lesser sum fixed by the jury as the correct amount of the lien;
that is, a little over $300 less than the amount claimed by the defendants.
HELD: 1. The intention of the parties was to make the deposit
respond for whatever amount the jury should find to be due the defend-
ants.
2. The stipulation conferred full authority upon the District
Court to do what it did.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
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